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I COMMENTS]i
THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND ITS IMPACT ON NATO:
DOES THE LEOPARD CHANGE HIS SP0 S?*
Henry M. Jackson**
I.
Many people during recent years have believed that the Soviet
Union was on a fixed course toward more moderate policies, and that
detente had come to stay, I have not shared this optimistic out-
look. But however sanguine any of us may have been about Soviet
policy, the brutal invasion of Czechoslovakia1 has been a sobering
experience. It calls to mind a comparable act in Stalin's time --
the Kremlin takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948.
Ii.
In military terms, the Soviet thrust into Czechoslovakia
proved what they can do. It was a vivid demonstration of Soviet
capability for rapid, selective mobilization, for efficient move-
ment of large combat and support forces over extensive distanceq,
and for the establishment and testing of effective lines of comm-
unication in support of military operations far from the Russian
homeland. The Soviet capability that was exercised so impressively
in Czechcslovakia is available for employment on other tasks.
The invasion of Czechoslovakia certainly made clear that
early "political warning" of a Soviet conventional move in Europe
cannot any longer be taken for granted. In the Czech assault,
until the moment of attack, the political signals of Soviet in-
tentions were at best ambiguous. The lightning-like drive into
Czechoslovakia took almost everybody by surprise. And it reminds
us once again of the vital role of forces-in-being.
This article was delivered before the Military Committee of
the North Atlantic Assembly at Brussels, Belgium in November 1968,
United States Senator from Washington.
Czechoslovakia was invaded during fhe night of August 20-21,
1968, by armed forces of the Soviet Union and four other comm-
unist states: Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and East Germany.
NATO2 combat units, on the line, ready to make a determined stand,
have far more deterrent value than mobilizable and deployable forces
that might be moved to the scene after the action begins.
III.
Also of special significance is the ominous revision of Soviet
international legal doctrine in the aftermath of the Czech invasion
-- a textbook case on the "heads I win, tails you lose" attitude of
the Kremlin.
You may recall that in the mid-1930's, the USSR joined the
League of Nations and entered alliances with France and Czechoslo-
vakia. At that time, Moscow acknowledged the concepts of national
sovereignty and non-interference with the rights of independent
states, in part to improve its credentials as a collaborator in
international undertakings. Maxim Litvinov, then Soviet Foreign
Minister, declared that the USSR would join agreements with other
states under conditions that recognized
the extension to every state belonging to such an
association of the liberty to preserve...its state
personality and the economic and social system chosen
by it -- in other words, reciprocal non-interference
in the domestic affairs of the states therein
associated...
Ironically, just a few weeks ago Litvinov's grandson, Pavel,
was- sentenced to exile in Siberia for defending Czechoslovakia's
right to "the economic and social system chosen by it.",
3
Since the mid-30's the principle of "reciprocal non-inter-
vention in the internal affairs of other states" had been a re-
curring concept in Soviet doctrine. As the number of countries
2 NATO--the 
-North Atlantic Treaty Organization--is the insti-
tutional development from the North Atlantic Treaty which was
signed on April 4, 1949, and entered into force on August 24,
1949. The original signatories were Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States. Greece and
Turkey joined the alliance in 1952, and the Federal Republic of
Germany in 1955.
3For Pavel Litvinov's final trial statement, see The Wash-
ington Post, October 15, 1968.
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calling themselves communist increased and divisions among them
became more apparent, Soviet writings had more and more tended to
emphasize the "complete equality" of all socialist states and the
strict observance among them of respect for independence and
national sovereignty. The communique from the 1960 meeting of
communist party leaders stated: "Every country in the socialist
camp is insured genuinely equal rights and independence."
As late as last April, during the height of Alexander Dubcek's
efforts at liberalization and reform, Kosygin declared that:
The Soviet state...made its invariable principle in
international policy the strict observance of equality,
national independence, and non-interference in the
internal affairs of other states and peoples.
Soon after, on August 20, the Soviets spearheaded the five-
nation intervention in Czechoslovakia. For some weeks there was
a flurry of inconsistent Soviet explanations and rationalizations.
4
Then Pravda5 struck. In a September 25 article, by Mr. Kovalev,
6
Pravda stated that Czechoslovakia's implementation of "self-deter-
mination" would have "caused harm to other socialist countries",
and that socialist states cannot act independently when such action
is contrary to the interests of the "socialist community of
nations." Said Pravda:
The sovereignty of each socialist country cannot be
opposed to the interests of the world of socialism, of
the world revolutionary movement.?
Little doubt is left that Moscow intends to determine what con-
stitutes action contrary to the interests of the "socialist community."
4The first explanation, namely that the intervention was at
the invitation of Czech government officials, was abruptly
dropped when it was learned that no such invitation was actually
sent.
5 Pravda is the official newspaper of the Soviet Union's
ruling Uommunist Party.
6Although unsigned articles are generally regarded as more
authoritative expressions of the Party leadership, the Kovalev
article seems, nevertheless, to have been the chosen vehicle
for the Party's declaration of policy.
7 Sovereignty and International Duties of Socialist Coun-
tries, Pravda, Sep-e-mber 25, 1968. The Soviet press agency's
(Novosti's) English translation was carried by the New York
Times, September 27, 1968.
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko confirmed the new doctrine in
a speech to the United Nations, he stated:
The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have on
many occasions warned those who are tempted to try and
roll back the socialist commonwealth, to snatch at least
one link from i , that we will neither tolerate nor allow
this to happen.t
Moscow, in essence, is saying, to a nation with leanings
toward socialism: if you think you have the right to independence
and self-determination, think again! You haven't and we will make
international law confirm it. You can have independence and self-
determination if we consider it proper for you; you cannot have it
if we consider it improper, because we have a doctrine of law that
says what is yours is mine and what is mine is mine.
The leopard does not change his spots. The Pravda-Gromyko
thesis is vintage Russian imperialism.
It should suprise no one that the East German Communist Party
promptly praised the idea of a "socialist commonwealth" run from
Moscow. For the most part, however, other communist parties have
greeted the new doctrine with silence -- or with dismay and de-
fiance. It is no wonder.
It seems to follow logically from the new doctrine that any
country which in the future adopts a communist government, either
by revolution or election, automatically becomes a part of the
"socialist commonwealth," defined by the Soviet Union, and as
such is subject to the Soviet concept of intervention--military
or otherwise--even against the will of the communist party in power.
Some people have seen the point. The British Communist Party
voiced strong condemnation of the new thesis in its house organ
Morning Star:
It is to be hoped that Mr. Kovalev's thesis will be
speedily and officially repudiated...It would do
irreparable damage to the unity of the international
Communist movement and relations between socialist
states if it gained any further currency. 9
8Speech by Gromyko at the United Nations, October 3, 1968.
9 Morning Star, September 27, 1968.
Austrian Communist Party Central Committee -member Heno Kostmann
disavowed the new doctrine as a danger to the survival of the
world communist movement:
...no norm exists or has existed anywhere giving a
socialist country or a group of such countries the
right to intervene in a fraternal socialist country.
Incidentally, such a right of intervention is in
conflict with all existing norms of relations among
fraternal socialist countries and among Communist
parties....On any basis other than...the basis of 10
autonomy, a world Communist movement is not possible.
The Yugoslavs have gotten the message too. President Tito,
who for twenty years has fought Soviet attempts to control his
party and country, spoke to his countrymen and warned the Soviet
bloc not to interfere in the affairs of Yugoslavia:
Comrades, as far as attempts are concerned to justify to
a certain extent the case of Czechoslovakia.. .a theory was
raised that sovereignty was not vital for small nations.
Well, it did not say small nations but that is what was
meant .... the small nations are in danger. The small
nations should act unitedly. They should agree.. .that
nobody has the right to interfere in their internal
affairs. These countries have the right to defend their
sovereignty*ll
The significant point, I believe, is not so much that the
Soviets have tried to provide ideological rationalization for what
they did in Czechoslovakia, but that they have consciously and
deliberately laid the basis for political pressures, blackmail and
possible adventures elsewhere.
IV.
What can we now say of Soviet intentions?
Moscow's sharp admonition to other socialist parties and states
to stay in line -- or else -- suggests a deep Soviet concern over
the kind of urge toward freedom that appeared-in Czechoslovakia and
that could spread to adjacent regions, including the USSR itself.
It suggests a concern in the Kremlin that the whole so-called
1 0Volksstimme, October 9, 1968.
1 1For a report on this speech and excerpts from it, see New
York Times, October 21, 1968.
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"socialist commonwealth" might come unglued.
Surely we cannot discount the danger that the course of re-
pression and counteraction in East Europe will produce new crises
and disturbances spilling over the frontiers of NATO. There is
always the possibility that Moscow may try to restore some unity
to the Warsaw Fact 1 2 nations by creating a major crisis centered
on Berlin and West Germany.
So we must see to the readiness of our immediate defenses along
NATO's central front. We need to assure ourselves that we have
enough high quality, ready forces in position, and prepared for
sustained combat, to convince our adversaries that military action
against NATO territory1 3 would be too hazardous for them.
And we must think hard about the implications of Soviet actions,
not only for the central region, but also for NATO's vital flanks.
Looking ahead, what are Soviet intentions toward Austria?
Consider also the problem of Yugoslavia. It is evident that
Yugoslavia's territory occupies a key position in relation to
NATO's'southeast flank. Under hostile control Yugoslavia would
constitute a corridor running from Central Europe to the Medi-
terranean, separating Greece and Turkey from the remainder of the
Alliance. What should be our response if the Kremlin seeks at any
time to enforce its new doctrine against Belgrade? The under-
standable uneasiness in Yugoslavia today can hardly be a matter of
indifference to NATO.
And what is the meaning of the far-ranging expansion of Soviet
naval activity in recent times? The facts are disturbing:
- Soviet naval deployments in the Indian Ocean continue.
Do they intend a permanent Soviet military presence there?
1 2Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance,
signed at Warsaw May 14, 1955, and entered into force June, 6, 1955.
It brought together all the East European Communist states except
Yugoslavia.
1 3The "NATO territory" as defined in Article 6 of the NATO
Treaty includes "the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or
North America,...the Algerian departments of France,...the occu-
pation forces of any Party in Europe,...the islands under the Juris-
diction of any party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic
of Cancer, or...any vessels or aircraft in this area of any of
the Parties."
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I doubt that all those ships are engaged in operations conn-
ected with the Soviet space program.
- During the invasion of Czechoslovakia; the Soviet
Mediterranean squadron was built up to some 50 ships, about
half of which were major combatant vessels, including sub-
marines. There is every indication-that the-Soviet Navy is
in the Mediterranean to stay.
- There have been Soviet naval exercises on- both sides
of the Straits of Gibraltar.
- There has been significant Soviet naval activity, on
a sustained basis, in the Norwegian Sea. Do they plan a
permanent naval presence in that area also?
The USSR is a dangerous and unpredictable opponent, with a
military capability whose reach is expanding. We cannot be con-
fident that a Soviet Union that invades Czechoslovakia will not
use military force to achieve its purposes on other-fronts, when
it thinks this can be done without running unacceptable risks.
The uncertainties we confront are compounded-by the poss-
ibility of further shifts within the Kremlin's-power structure,
where there is already evidence of a move toward the hard-liners.
V.
So we meet today in an atmosphere of turbulence and uncer-
tainty; but we also meet in a spirit of renewed solidarity and con-
fidence. The governments and peoples of our Alliance are facing
with a new seriousness the problems posed by Soviet actions.
There is little disagreement in America about the value of the
Atlantic Alliance or the importance and firmness of the U.S.
commitment to the defense of the North Atlanttc'area. But I and
others in our Congress have had a severe problem in trying to main-
tain an effective American combat force in Western Europe. That
problem resulted in large part from a widespread-feeling in my
country that so many Europeans were less concerned with the
security of their homelands than we were. To many Americans it
has seemed that a prosperous Western Europe was not making a
reasonably proportionate contribution to the common'defense effort.
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Clearly, the tasks ahead call for a new determination, on
both sides of the Atlantic, that will not only see us through this
period of crisis but that will serve the-Alliance well for the
long, hard pull. The burdens of our common security will make
substantial demands on us all -- for many years to come.
You can understand that I am heartened by the evidence that
more of you here in Europeare recognizing that there-is a direct
relationship between your willingness*.to drawon your own resources
for your own defense, and the willingness of-the American people
andthe. American Congress.to provide substantial resources and
forces for mutual security in NATO.
So I am encouraged by the current initiatives of some Euro-
pean members of the Alliance to reinvigorate*NATO. For I am con-
vinced that the future vitality of the Alliance depends in very
large measure on the degree aid quality of European efforts to
keep NATO strong,
